Interview for “Freitag“ of 13 June 2008


FREITAG: How can we imagine the typical call to action for the QuickReactionForce in North Afghanistan?


ANDRÉ BRIE: In response to military activities of the Taleban, al-Qaida or other insurgent groups among which there count the formations of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar who with his party Hezb-i-Ilsamii acts up more and more also in the North.


Who gives the order for action?

First of all, this would be a case for the regional command in North Afghanistan led by Germany.


Are we witnessing with the take-over of the QRF mission by the Federal Army a qualitatively new stage of the German commitment on the Hindu Kush?

Clearly yes. The QRF mission shows a sneaking expansion of the military part assumed by the Federal Army in Afghanistan. After all, the QRF can be openly requested for combat missions – even if these take part in other regional segments of ISAF; last but not least in the South, where there takes place in fact a cooperation between ISAF and the Operation Enduring Freedom led by the USA.


That means, there is no clear delimitation from Enduring Freedom. In consequence this means that the QRF forces may operate outside of the ISAF and thus the UN mandate?

I look at it that way, the Federal Government will formally justify it by the fact that ISAF and OEF continue to be seperated, but in practice, this has been different for a long time already.


Shouldn't there have been at least a debate, maybe even a seperate decision on that in the Federal Parliament?

A debate surely, because it shows itself more and more that the whole Afghanistan strategy of NATO has failed. Also the fact that the Norwegians, where the Socialist Left Party participates in government, are now returning their QRF mandate, is a sign that the military situation has clearly worsened, as this can also be gathered by the way from the situation analysis of the foreign ministry in Oslo. The mandate for the Federal Army in Afghanistan would have to be changed in any event – and this by the Parliament in Berlin.


That now looks as if there won't even be, on 1 July, any regular transition between the Norwegian and the German QRF mandate...

It is a regular transition; however, the Norwegians might also have been free to continue the QRF mission, but the Socialist Left Party as junior party in the government did no longer want to assume this responsibility under any circumstances.


You have just returned from travelling in Afghanistan – how high at the moment are the risks for the QRF to be involved in serious combat actions?

The risk increases in particular for one reason, because a growing majority of the Afghan population sees in all foreigners and also in all foreign troups quislings of the United States.


You have been talking for several times now already of possible interventions of the QRF in the South of Afghanistan; that way, there is quietly executed as a fact what the Federal Government never wanted, at least not officially.

That's true. There are with respect to my last report to the European Parliament that I submitted there as Afghanistan reporter, motions for change by the conservative, the liberal and the social-democratic fractions. This large majority demands explicitly that all European states – without national reservations – should also be employed for combat missions in the dangerous regions of the South. That shows how large the pressure is, and how readily majorities in the European Parliament are apparently prepared to yield to it.


Can you talk about a central command force that reveals itself in the operations of the Taleban?

That certainly exists, and it has certainly become more efficient as well. In parallel, there are very many decentralised and uncoordinated struggles. They mainly depart from local groups that cannot be attributed so easily to the Taleban.

Aside from that, there is also the very well organised al-Qaida that is anything but identical with the Taleban. In the meantime, also the following of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is very centrally organised and disposes of a high capacity for battle.


Are there indications of any political strategy of the Taleban. Do they want to return to an order such as it has existed up to October 2001?

That is undisputed. Naturally, there are such forces among the Taleban, on the other hnd, there exist considerable parts of Taleban factions and leaders who want to impose their ideological fundamentalism by way of participating in current power.


Does that mean that certain Taleban fractions would let themselves be integrated in today's political system of Afghanistan?

If yes, then with a very reactionary ideology for which, however, in government and in large parts of the parliament, there are both points of contact as well as sympathisers. Moreover, efforts cannot be overlooked in the Afghanistan policy of the USA and Great Britain to promote such kind of integration.


The way to a political solution?

If there is linked to that a fundamental change of international strategy that passes from military involvement to civilian reconstruction, then yes. There would have to be a containment of fundamentalism, however, which would otherwise provoke a devastating situation for women.


Would it be a signal for the moderate Taleban forces if the NATO were to begin to think about an exit strategy and that openly?

I should consider that the currently most effective signal that could be sent to these fractions.


The conversation was led by Lutz Herden